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BOOK REVIEWS
IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS. By Raoul Berger.1
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973. Pp. xii, 345. $14.95.
In 1970, apparently motivated by President Richard Nixon's desire
to retaliate for the rejection of two of his nominees to the Supreme
Court,2 then-House Minority Leader and now-Vice President Gerald
Ford mounted an abortive drive to impeach Justice William Douglas.
Ford introduced the drive with the announcement that "an impeach-
able offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives
considers it to be." 3  Ford's sweeping assertion of power impelled
legal historian Raoul Berger4 to make an intensive study of the sub-
ject." The result, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems, was
published in February 1973, the same month the Senate established
the Watergate Committee. 6 This coincidence precludes a charge that
Berger wrote his book with Watergate in mind, which is just as well,
for President Nixon, himself now the object of an impeachment in-
vestigation, will find scant comfort in its pages.
I
Berger lays the premise for his work in the introduction:
The constitutional grant of power to impeach raises important questions
... . Resort to the historical sources and close analysis of the several
textual provisions may throw fresh light on the problems. To grasp
the place of impeachment in the constitutional scheme, and its potential
role for the future, we need better to understand the use to which it
1. Charles Warren Senior Fellow in American Legal History, Harvard Law
School.
2. So Berger alleges. R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTrTUTONAL PROB-
LEMS 94 (1973) [hereinafter cited as IMPEAcHMENT].
3. Id. at 53 n.I.
4. Berger is also the author of the widely admired CONGRESS V. THE SUPREmE
COURT (1969).
5. Berger quotes or refers to Ford's statement four times. IwEAcHMENT 53, 86,
94, 103.
6. S. Res. 60, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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was put in the past. For it was with the historical past in mind that
the Founders wrought.7
Proceeding from this premise, Berger surveys in chapter I the historical
development and use of impeachment by the English Parliament, con-
cluding with two observations: Parliament could punish an act as
treason even though no statute previously had defined the act as treas-
onable; and "an indictable treason was not the prerequisite of im-
peachment."8  These points are significant because they help support
Berger's later conclusion that impeachable offenses are not limited to
crimes. Since parliamentary impeachments frequently were for treas-
on, one might be led to argue that impeachment lay historically only
for the commission of a crime. Berger blunts the force of that argu-
ment by demonstrating that many impeachments were for acts first
declared to be treasonable in the course of the proceedings in which
the accuseds were convicted.
Chapter II, the longest, attempts an examination of all the issues
that arise, more or less, from the constitutional phrase "high crimes
and misdemeanors."9  This common thread is too weak to tie the is-
sues together in a comprehensible pattern, and the chapter suffers
from the resulting dispersion of aim and effort. Nevertheless, two
of Berger's most important conclusions emerge with clarity. The first
is that both English history10 and Senate precedent"1 make plain that
an indictable crime is not a prerequisite to impeachment.12  The sec-
ond is that, although an indictable crime is unnecessary, the phrase
"high crimes and misdemeanors" has a "limited, technical" meaning,'9
importing more than "petty misconduct."' 4  The "great offenses"'"
historically encompassed within this "limited, technical" meaning are,
according to Berger, "reducible to intelligible categories:" misapplica-
tion of funds; abuse of official power; neglect of duty; encroachment
7. IMPEACHMENT 5-6. He repeats the premise at page 54.
8. Id. at 52.
9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
10. IMPEAcHmNT 59-73.
11. Id. at 56, 58 &n.16.
12. "In sum, 'high crimes and misdemeanors' appear to be words of art confined
to impeachments, without roots in the ordinary criminal law and which ...had no
relation to whether an indictment would lie in the particular circumstances." Id. at
62.
13. Id. at 87, 106-07.
14. Id. at 90.
15. E.g., id. at 101.
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on or contempts of Parliament's prerogatives; and corruption.' Ber-
ger's supporting argument is in three steps: (1) these categories were
settled by English precedent before the Constitution was framed; (2)
the framers of the Constitution were aware of the English precedents;
and (3) the framers intended to adopt the English precedents.' 7  An-
other reviewer has queried the second step, and has noted that the
third begs rather than resolves the question of the meaning of "high
crimes and misdemeanors."'"
Berger goes on to argue in chapter II that the "limited, technical"
meaning of "high crimes and misdemeanors" is applicable only to the
impeachment of Presidents, not to the impeachment of judges; that
is, that judges can be impeached for misconduct that would not author-
ize the impeachment of Presidents.' 9 This interpretation raises two
problems. The first, which Berger acknowledges, is that of "giving
the [identical] words both a narrow and a broad construction."20  The
difficulty of this feat previously had led Berger to the opposite conclu-
sion.2 He justifies his change of mind on two grounds: the removal
by impeachment of a President "must generate shock waves that can
rock the very foundations of government," 2 a consideration absent in
the case of a judge, even a Justice of the Supreme Court;23 and Presi-
dents can be removed by voters at the next general election, whereas
federal judges have life tenure. 4  Ultimately, of course, both of these
justifications must find support in some actual or presumed intention
of the framers, but Berger provides no evidence of it. It is one thing
to construe constitutional language in a way that appears to be inconsis-
tent with original intent; it surely must be more difficult to justify giv-
ing the same constitutional provision two inconsistent meanings. Yet
Berger condemns the Supreme Court for doing the former (in the
context of jury trial guarantees), 2  but engages in the latter himself.
The second problem springing from Berger's distinction between
16. Id. at 70-71.
17. Id. at 54-55; cf. id. at 106-07. With respect to the second step, see especially
id. at 87 n.160.
18. Bates, Book Review, 25 STAN. L. REv. 908, 911-15 (1973).
19. IMPEACHMENT 91-93.
20. Id. at 91.
21. Id. at 91 n.181.
22. Id. at 91.
23. Id. at 92.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 203-04.
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Presidents and judges for purposes of removal for "high crimes and
misdemeanors" is that he fails to draw the distinction himself when
he analyzes the impeachment precedents in the Senate. Berger ear-
lier has asserted that "a succession of 'guilty' verdicts [in the Senate]
has tacitly 'settled' that impeachment lies for nonindictable offenses. "20
But all of these impeachments were of judges. If Berger applied his
logic consistently, his only relevant precedent on the question of what
conduct constitutes a "high crime and misdemeanor" for the impeach-
ment and removal of a President would be that of Andrew Johnson.
And it is impossible to read Johnson's acquittal in the Senate as sup-
port for the assertion that an indictable crime is not a requisite. Ber-
ger's effort to give two distinct meanings to "high crimes and misde-
meanors" therefore fails, both as constitutional construction and as in-
terpretation of precedent.
More persuasive is his handling of this matter in chapters IV
and V. Berger argues that the "good behavior" provision of article
I implies, first, that impeachment is not the sole method of removing
judges,27 and, second, that misconduct which would not constitute a
"high crime and misdemeanor" nevertheless might justify removal of
a judge.28  The removal procedure he envisions is one administered
by judges rather than by the Senate.2 9 He argues that Congress, un-
der the necessary and proper clause, 30 can enact legislation facilitating
such removal.3" Chapter V continues to rely upon the difference be-
tween the "good behavior" standard of article HI and the "high crimes
and misdemeanors" standard of article II in its discussion of insanity,
disability, and senility. Berger concludes that a President cannot be
impeached, but that a judge can be removed by other judges, for any
one of them.
Chapter II also considers whether impeachment is a "criminal pro-
26. Id. at 56.
27. Id. at 135-59.
28. E.g., id. at 123-25; see id. at 159-65, 179-80.
29. Id. at 175. An arguably similar procedure has in fact been implemented. See
Chandler v. Judicial Council, 382 U.S. 1003 (1966), motion for leave to file petition
for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus denied, 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
31. IsPTEACNI-IuNT 132-33, 174. It would not be the first time legislative power
was justified by resort to an article Il provision. Compare the power to legislate with
respect to maritime concerns, e.g., G. GuNTnER & N. DOWLING, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CONSTITTIONAL LAW 406 (8th ed. 1970).
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ceeding." The question arises because of apparently inconsistent lan-
guage in the Constitution. On the one hand, article I, section 3, pro-
vides:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office
of honor, Trust, or Profit under the United States: but the Party con-
victed shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial,
Judgment and Punishment, according to law.
On the other hand, article 1H, section 2, provides that "The President
. . . shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses
against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment." Simi-
larly, article III, section 2, states that "The Trial of all Crimes, except
in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . . ." Neither the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment nor the jury trial guar-
antee of the sixth amendment contains any language indicating
whether it was meant to bear on impeachment. After carefully com-
paring the language and historical meaning of these various provisions,
Berger persuasively concludes that impeachment is not a "criminal pro-
ceeding" subject to the jury trial and double jeopardy protections.3
Berger closes chapter II with a discussion of the political nature of
impeachment trials. 33 The remarkable thing about this discussion, in
view of Berger's obvious bias for historical learning, is its failure to
consider the relevance of changes in the Constitution. Methods of
electing Presidents 34 and Senators35 have been changed, and a method
for removing a disabled President has been added.36 Since Berger
does not mention them, these alterations presumably are irrelevant.
Also missing is any mention of the question whether Senators, who
constitute the "jury" in an impeachment trial, must be impartial in the
sense of not having prejudged the merits.37 But this omission may
be understandable, as Berger wrote before Watergate became the sub-
ject of a senatorial investigation.3
Chapter VI argues that the "high crimes and misdemeanors" and
32. IMPEACHMENT 78-85.
33. Id. at 94-102.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
37. Except in the context of the impeachment trial of President Johnson. IM-
PEACHMENT 266.
38. See Collings, Book Review, 62 CAiu. L. Rnv. 294 (1974).
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"good behavior" standards both permit removal from office for nonoffi-
cial as well as official acts. 9 Chapter VII reviews the one precedent
which seems to hold that legislators are not subject to impeachment,
and urges that it be overruled.40 Chapters VII and IX are detailed
examinations of the impeachment trials of Justice Samuel Chase and
President Andrew Johnson, respectively.
1[
Chapter III advances the thesis that judicial review is available to
determine whether the conduct for which a President or judge was
impeached and convicted constitutes a "high crime and misdemeanor."
Berger acknowledges that "[flrom Story onward it has been thought
that in the domain of impeachment the Senate has the last word; that
even the issue whether the charged misconduct constitutes an im-
peachable offense is unreviewable, because the trial of impeachments
is confided to the Senate alone. '' 41 But he argues that Powell v. Mc-
Cormack4- undercut this position. Powell held (1) that judicial re-
view of Congressman Powell's exclusion was not precluded by the
"political question" doctrine, and (2) that the House of Representa-
tives was without power to exclude, as distinguished from expel,
a member for misconduct. 43 The House had argued that article I,
section 5, which provides that "each house shall be the judge of the
• ..qualifications of its own members," was a "textually demonstrable
commitment" of its action to a coordinate branch of the federal govern-
ment, and, therefore, that the validity of Powell's exclusion was unre-
viewable44 under the political question doctrine of Baker v. Carr."5
But the Supreme Court held that the "qualifications" the House was
39. Berger submits this proposition in the face of some impressive statements to
the contrary, e.g., IMPEACHMENT 207, which he labels "dicta," id. at 208-11, and with
a recognition that no decided cases support it, id. at 213.
40. Id. at 223. The case was the attempted removal by impeachment of Senator
William Blount in 1797. "By a vote of 14 to 11 the Senate dismissed the charges
on the ground that it 'ought not to hold jurisdiction.'" Id. at 214.
41. Id. at 103 (footnotes omitted). This thesis also is examined at length in Bates,
supra note 18, at 919-25. My focus on the question is different than his, as is my
conclusion.
42. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
43. Id. at 510-11, 547-49.
44. Id. at 513-14.
45. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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authorized to "judge" were limited to the standing qualifications listed
in the Constitution, namely, age, residence, and citizenship. 6
Berger's argument overlooks the key factor in Powell: the House,
by "excluding" Powell, had attempted to circumvent the specific con-
stitutional restriction that a member may be "expelled" only "with the
concurrence of two thirds."47  The Speaker of the House had ruled
that a simple majority was enough to exclude (again, as distinguished
from expel) Powell, and some early procedural matters leading to
Powell's exclusion were approved by votes of less than two-thirds."'
Had the Court permitted Powell's exclusion to stand, it would have
sanctioned the circumvention of a specific constitutional restriction by
a play on words.
Berger is correct in his basic conclusion that Powell made inroads
on the "textually demonstrable commitment" element of the political
question doctrine. But the question is whether the inroads were as
extensive as Berger believes. Read narrowly, all Powell stands for
is that the commitment of a question to a coordinate branch of the
federal government does not necessarily preclude judicial review if the
Constitution itself sets standards for the resolution of that question.
This reading of Powell would dispose of the hypothetical horror that
upsets Berger the most: the possibility of convicting a President or
judge of treason on the ground that he had attempted to subvert the
Constitution." s The Constitution itself defines treason,50 and the
Court in such a case could look to that definition for standards, as
it looked to the definition of "qualifications" in Powell. This reading
of Powell also has the advantage, which Berger's does not, of being
consistent with the few available indications of the Supreme Court's
attitude. Only once has an impeached and convicted officer chal-
lenged the validity of his removal. Judge Halsted Ritter sued for his
salary in the Court of Claims after his removal by impeachment. In
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
47. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5.
48. The House committee established to investigate Powelrs peccadillos recom-
mended that he be seated and fined. 395 U.S. at 492. The report was amended to
substitute exclusion for seating and fining by a vote of 248 to 176, less than two-thirds.
Id. at 492-93. That this was the key factor in the Court's decision is demonstrated
by the fact that the Court devoted one entire section (part IV) of its opinion to a
discussion of "Exclusion or Expulsion." Id. at 506-12.
49. IMPEACHMENT 105-06.
50. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 3.
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dismissing the suit, that court quoted an earlier Supreme Court dictum:
In the case of State of Mississippi v. Johnson [71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475,
501 (1867)], the Chief Justice said with reference to a hypothetical
case where the House of Representatives had impeached the President
and an injunction was sought to restrain the Senate from sitting as a
court of impeachment---"Would the strange spectacle be offered to
the public world of the attempt by this court to arrest proceedings in
that court?" implying that the Supreme Court would take no such ac-
tion even though it was claimed that the Senate was acting unconstitu-
tionally.51
The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Berger does not discuss Ritter
v. United States; indeed, he cites it only once in a footnote 2 He
neither cites nor discusses the Mississippi v. Johnson dictum."
Article I, section 3, provides, "The Senate shall have the sole Power
to try all Impeachments." Berger's second proposition in support of
his judicial review thesis is: "We need only read the power to 'try'
as a grant of jurisdiction to try a case in the first instance, leaving
untouched an appeal to the Supreme Court from action in excess of
jurisdiction. . . . "'I Nowhere in the course of this argument does
Berger advert to the language of article I, section 2: "The House of
Representatives . . . shall have the sole Power of Impeachment."
But if use of the word "sole" in section 3 does not preclude review
of a judgment of conviction, then by -a parity of reasoning its use in
section 2 would not preclude review of the articles of impeachment,
to determine-to use the closest analogy I can think of-whether they
state a cause of action. And that possibility collides head on with
the dictum of Chief Justice Chase in Mississippi v. Johnson.
Nor is Berger specific concerning the details of how the impeached
and removed officer obtains direct review in the Supreme Court, as
he appears to consider possible. Obviously, such litigation is not
within the Court's original jurisdiction, 5 and to suppose that the Court
has "appellate jurisdiction" over Congress is bizarre.50 Clearly, then,
51. Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. C1. 293, 300 (1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 668
(1937).
52. IWEACHmENT 103 n.4.
53. He cites the case on an unrelated point in the course of discussing the im-
peachment trial of President Johnson. Id. at 286-87.
54. Id. at 111.
55. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
56. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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the officer would have to begin his challenge in a district court and
proceed from there by way of appeal. But supposing this is a possibil-
ity, what is to prevent Congress from enacting legislation which pro-
hibits any federal court from exercising jurisdiction, original or appel-
late, to review any question raised in the course of an impeachment?
This would renew the debate concerning the meaning and scope of
Ex parte McCardle,1 which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction an appeal
under consideration when Congress repealed the statute under which
the appeal had been taken. Berger does not address the question.
Berger's third proposition in support of his thesis uncharacteristically
lapses into hyperbole and bombast; for example:
Although impeachment was chiefly designed to check Executive abuses
and oppressions, there was no thought of delivering either the President
or the Judiciary to the unbounded discretion of Congress . . . . "Lim-
its" on Congress determined by Congress itself would be no limits at
all. 58
This argument, if it can be called that,59 conveniently assumes that
any power not subject to judicial review is "unbounded discretion."
Forgotten is Chief Justice Harlan Stone's caustic remark, "Courts are
not the only agency of government that must be assumed to have ca-
pacity to govern."'60
"Finally," Berger argues, "if it be assumed that the 'sole power to
try' conferred insulation from review, it must yield to the subsequent
Fifth Amendment . . . . If the Constitution does in fact place limits
upon the power of impeachment, action beyond those limits is without
'due process of law' in its primal sense .... "61 This is just sophis-
ticated question-begging. To begin with, it is quite clear that every
congressional act in excess of constitutional authority is not a depriva-
tion of due process in any sense, "primal" or otherwise.62 Moreover,
57. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). For the debate, see Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. 530 (1962). See also G. GuNTHER & N. DOWLING, supra note 31, at 51-
57.
58. IMPEACHMENT 117-18.
59. "The suggestion that [congressional spending power] must now be curtailed b
judicial fiat because it may be abused by unwise use hardly rises to the dignity of ar-
gument. So may judicial power be abused." Later-Chief Justice Stone in United States
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87 (1936) (dissenting opinion).
60. Id.
61. IMPEACHMENT 120.
62. See, e.g., Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939); Frothing-
ham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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to assume that judicial review is available to rectify the alleged dep-
rivation begs the question because that is the very point at issue.
If chapter III is viewed merely as a prediction that the Supreme
Court will hold judgments of impeachment reviewable, it may be cor-
rect. But to the extent it purports to base that prediction on a rea-
soned extrapolation from authoritative sources, it is dubious. And to
the extent it attempts to justify judicial review, it is -totally unconvin-
cing. Too much contrary authority is ignored, and too many hard ques-
tions are bypassed to make it cogent.
CONCLUSION
I probably have made Berger appear more dogmatic than he is.
For -the most part, Berger is tentative and self-effacing: "The con-
clusion that 'high crimes and misdemeanors' was adopted as a 'tech-
nical' limiting phrase leaves perplexing problems; and it is to be hoped
that my reflections will stimulate further study and investigation."0 3
Certainly the result of his labor is a timely, interesting, and valuable
contribution to a previously ignored subject. Perhaps no higher praise
can be given than to observe that all future debate about impeachment
will use Berger's book as a starting point.
JULES B. GERARD'
THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS. By Boris I. Bittker.1 New York:
Vintage Books, 1973. Pp. 191. $1.95 (paper).
One leaves the reading of this short, scholarly work with revived
hunger for a society capable of acting upon Boris Bittker's generous
legal and moral perceptions of why and how we should provide con-
temporary black American citizens with reparations for the evils they
have suffered at the hands of the white majority. But one senses that
this hunger will go unrequited, much like, in Lincoln's phrase, "the
63. IMPlEACHMENT 93.
* Professor of Law, Washington University.
1. Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University.
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